The fund's overall size in terms of credit disbursement and member countries is comparatively small, however. At its current size, the fund has not been able to respond to liquidity demands of the larger member countries to the same extent as it could service liquidity demands from smaller member countries (Culpeper 2006: 60; see also Rosero 2014) . For the smaller member countries, maximum borrowing amounts resemble or exceed their annual maximum for borrowing from the IMF (see Table A1 , Figure 1 ). Total disbursements by the FLAR on average amounted to about two-thirds of total IMF financing for the smaller member countries (Ecuador borrowed more than twice as much from the FLAR as from the IMF). Larger member countries find only a fraction of possible IMF borrowing volume in their possible drawing amounts from the FLAR (see Figures 2 and 3 on the use of the FLAR and on the volume of regionally drawn emergency financing as share of the region's total emergency financing). Ocampo and Titelman (2012: 28) explore the possibility of expanding the FLAR into a so-called "Latin American Fund": "A minimum step in the case of FLAR is obviously to increase the quotas of its members, which are smaller than those in the IMF, particularly for its largest members, and now minute relative to their foreign exchange reserves." However, any expansion of the fund's volume and membership would need to take into consideration a change in the current voting mechanism of one vote per member country -especially if larger Latin American economies, such as, for example, Brazil, are about to join. At the same time, it is precisely such egalitarian governance structures that may be an important ingredient to the strong ownership that characterizes FLAR and its membership, and that may explain the absence of any arrears in repayment ever since. The debate about a possible expansion of FLAR to further member countries is fueled by new proposals for enlargement criteria, potential new member countries, distribution of shares, and checks and balances to provide adequate incentives for small and large member countries alike and an appropriate mechanism to avoid moral hazard (Titelman et al. 2014 ).
Apart from Venezuela, the member countries' macroeconomic situation has improved considerably when compared to the end of the 1990s. Inflation rates have decreased to single-digit levels and external debt stocks have been reduced, while some countries, in particular Peru, managed to stockpile foreign exchange reserves. While Colombia has qualified for a pre-conditional IMF loan in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the case of the remaining members is less clear.
As mentioned above, FLAR lending volume exceeds the ones of the IMF in two cases, Bolivia and Paraguay, while in other cases, accessible financing volumes from FLAR come relatively close to IMF maximum drawing amounts. Only for the two big members in terms of economic size, Colombia and Venezuela, would the FLAR not be a sufficiently big source of emergency finance. The AMF has the objective of (1) correcting disequilibria in the balance-ofpayments of member states by providing short-term and medium-term credit facilities, (2) striving for the removal of restrictions on current payments between member states, (3) establishing policies and modes of Arab monetary co-operation, (4) rendering advice, whenever called upon to do so, with regard to policies related to the investment of the financial resources of member states in foreign markets, (5) promoting the development of Arab financial markets, (6) paving the way towards the creation of a unified Arab currency, and (7) The AMF developed several own lines of credit with different lending terms, all of which include the agreement on and fulfillment of a reform program that the disbursement is conditional on. The only exceptions are the above-mentioned fasttrack credit lines, the automatic loan, and the short term liquidity facility.
The AMF came into being in 1977, with 22 West Asian and African countries within the framework of the League of Arab States, founded in 1945. At the end of the 1960s, "… [oil-rich] Arab countries were encouraged to promote Arab regional financial agencies and to supply them with adequate resources to enable them to reduce the bilateral lending that was now being provided not only to other Arab countries but also to other developing countries that were suffering from the rise in oil prices" (Corm 2006: 294) . The oil price boom in the early 1970s provided the economic and political context of the AMF's foundation (Corm 2006) . Such favorable conditions did not last long but the AMF "survived the sharp downturn in oil prices during the 1980s and 1990s, and operations continued, albeit at lower levels than in the 1970s. Although the sharp upturn in oil prices beginning in 2000 led to an increase in funding, funding did not return to the levels of the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s" (Corm 2006: 291) .
During the Arab Spring, the IMF provided short-term liquidity assistance to several AMF member countries, i.e. to the newly elected democratic governments in Tunisia (USD 500 million) and Yemen (USD 550 million). In 2012, Morocco has been included in the IMF's Precautionary Credit Line (PCL) (USD 6.2 billion). Meanwhile, the AMF in 2012 and 2013 disbursed a total number of four loans, including to Tunisia, Yemen, and Morocco, three of them with a volume of about USD 180 million (see Figures 5 and 6 ).
The macroeconomic stance of the member countries is very heterogeneous, ranging from rich and stable oil exporters to very poor and developing economies partially dealing with economic crises. For a joint liquidity fund, such heterogeneity provides excellent conditions since the likelihood that all member countries draw on the fund's resources at the same time is less than in a perfectly harmonized group of countries. At the same time, the largest member countries seem to have successfully stockpiled national foreign exchange reserves. They can only draw on comparatively small amounts of liquidity at the regional body, relative to their size. Hence, the AMF does not seem to be highly relevant for these countries. Only for two of the very small countries like Somalia and Sudan can AMF provide volumes similar to the IMF access limits (see Table 2 .A, Figure 4) . In most cases, AMF funding is used as a supplement to IMF loans (see Table A .2). In addition, a CMIM Precautionary Line was set up for crisis prevention for countries with strong fundamentals. In essence, the CMIM creates a multilateral currency swap arrangement governed henceforth by only one contractual arrangement. The CMIM represents a swap fund in the sense that each country's foreign exchange contributions are made not in advance but on demand.
The decision-making structure of the CMIM consists of a ministerial and an executive level. The former's decisions are taken in consensus while the latter's decisions are taken by a two-thirds majority rule. Each country is given basic votes (except Hong Kong). Additionally, each country holds votes depending on its contributions. A contribution of USD one billion gives a country one vote. The system has been designed in a way that no country holds a veto power. The large plus-three partner countries, however, hold a majority of about 70 percent of votes (see Table A .3).
Historically, CMI countries could draw on up to 20 percent of the maximum amount of the entitled disbursement volume without conditionality. Access to more than 20 percent of the maximum drawing volume was conditional on the existence of an IMF-supported program. Later on, the unconditional lending limit has been raised to 30 percent with the prospect of the ceiling of non-IMF-linked disbursements being further increased to 40 percent of the maximum amount of drawings for each country. Such delinked liquidity provision can be distributed (1) to address balance-of-payments and short-term liquidity difficulties in the region and (2) to supplement the existing international financial arrangements (Bank of Japan 2009) upon demand depending on the decision of a two-thirds majority (Grimes 2011) . However, further delinking from the IMF has not yet been realized.
Currently, the CMIM is developing more forceful regional surveillance capacities. Since 2011, the member states developed an independent regional surveillance unit based in Singapore, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) (for a detailed description of AMRO see Siregar/Chabchitrchaidol 2013) . AMRO was officially founded as an international organization at the beginning of 2016. AMRO's advisory role requires asserting its independence and distinction from IMF advice in order to build up a truly regional liquidity-providing mechanism.
Among the ASEAN-5 countries, Singapore's level of economic development compares to industrialized countries, its inflation rate is comparatively low, and its macroeconomic conditions are favorable and stable, including the current account surpluses. Malaysia and Thailand are comparable to Singapore in terms of economic strength. In general, inflation rates among the ASEAN-5 countries have harmonized to a similarly low level and economic growth is similarly dynamic. Debt structures have equally improved, except for rising shares of short-term debt in Malaysia and Thailand. The remaining economies, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar, clearly lag behind in these terms, despite increasingly dynamic economic growth, in particular in Vietnam.
It is remarkable that, due to the big size of the CMIM, almost half of the member countries could count on access volumes higher than their IMF access quota, as Figure 7 shows. At the same time, for the two largest members, Japan and China, CMIM funds alone would be far too small to tackle a crisis when taking IMF access quota as a reference. Figures 8 and 9 show that none of the member countries used the CMIM. 
d. Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD)
In 2009 member states. Neither the EDB nor the EFSD provides information on the voting system of the fund. Russia holds about 88 percent of total capital and can thus be assumed to have a veto power in the governing bodies (see Table A .4).
The EFSD essentially provides only one line of credit for emergency financing that requires a reform program whose implementation is rigorously monitored for disbursement decisions. The EFSD conditions its lending upon the debt history of the requesting country with the EFSD, its member countries, or other financial institutions. The borrower should not be in arrears with any of those.
The fund aims at achieving its objectives by disbursing financial credits and investment loans. Financial credits are intended to finance budget deficits, support in case of balance-of-payments problems, or stabilize national currencies. Investment loans are intended to finance interstate investment projects. The EFSD plans to also provide grants from the fund's net profit to finance social programs of the member states' governments. The highest decision-making body is the Council, which is composed of the member states' Finance Ministers and chaired by the Finance Minister of the Russian Federation. Lending decisions are based on the perceived urgency of a country's financing needs as well as a country's creditworthiness and long-term debt sustainability (EFSD n.d.-c). While emergency financing in times of balance-of-payments difficulties is one of its objectives, the EFSD is not oriented towards further regional monetary cooperation.
Until today, the EFSD has disbursed five financial credits, three of them in 2015 (see Figures 11 and 12 ).
While in terms of economic size the EFSD is clearly dominated by Russia, which accounts for 85 percent of the regional GDP (see Figure 10 ), in macroeconomic terms, the members are less divergent. As former members of the Soviet Union, all of them demonstrate a low degree of productive differentiation, and most of them are heavily dependent on natural resources exports, with high external deficits and debt levels. For some of the members, like Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic, the EFSD could substitute the IMF in terms of volume of funding, while especially for Russia the quota would be far too small to tackle a crisis. 
